In Virginia DeMarce’s “Murphy’s Law” (Grantville Gazette, Volume 5), Tony Adducci tells Count August about the real-life “Mannington Mine Disaster”: “It was at Farmington, right beyond the border of the Ring of Fire, heading east past the high school. There was a big explosion in Consolidation Coal Company’s number-nine mine. Ninety-nine miners were inside; only thirteen managed to escape right away. They got eight more out later. That left the rest of them to die underground. Seventy-eight men.”
This article will look at three major topics: the hazards to which workers are exposed, the legal and social framework by which the cost of accidents can be re-allocated, and the safety technology with which the risk of accidents can be reduced.
Industrial accidents can result in damage or destruction of property (both of the factory owner, and of neighbors), and loss of life or limb (by workers, customers, and passersby). In this article, I am mostly concerned with the risks to workers. However, I will consider the safety of passengers in the case of the transport industry.
The most obvious hazards are the physical ones, of the Road Runner-Wile E. Coyote variety: being crushed, slashed, impaled, or blown to pieces. In Virginia DeMarce’s ” ‘Til We Meet Again,” set in 1634, a flying saw blade cut Billy Nelson in half at the hip, and turned Thomas Merton Smith into a double amputee and Foster Caldwell into an incomplete quadriplegic.
Heat and cold can cause direct damage, in the form of burns and frostbite, or merely result in fatigue or weakness (which in itself can make the worker more accident-prone). High humidity exacerbates the effects of high temperature, and low humidity can cause respiratory problems.
Carrying a load, or performing the same movement over and over again, can harm you. If you move around, you can slip, fall into a pit, or get run over. Our bodies don’t like chronic exposure to vibrations, either.
The adoption of up-time innovations will expose many down-timers to a new hazard: electrical shock. Previously, only those working outdoors, and thus vulnerable to lightning, would have been at significant risk. And electrical accidents are often (perhaps 40%) fatal.
Our senses can also be assaulted: we can be blinded by the high-intensity light of a welding torch, or deafened by the incessant clank of machinery. Nor is it good to be literally “in the dark”; inadequate illumination results in accidents.
In some industries, workers will be exposed to dangerous chemicals, by skin contact, or, more insidiously, inhalation. These exposures are not limited to those who make chemicals. The mineworker can breathe in coal dust; the painter can have a reaction to his paints and solvents. Machinery uses lubricants and coolants which can aerosolize, or merely evaporate.
Gases under pressure present additional hazards, as they can be released explosively.
Fires require heat, a combustible substance, and an oxidant (usually oxygen). They can be caused by open flames, electricity (including lightning), and spontaneous combustion of certain gases and dusts. Wood construction is common in seventeenth century Europe and wood is flammable. The up-time industries will involve manufacture and use of a variety of flammable liquids, and they will also generate dusts.
Some of the hazards mentioned above are those in which the exposure result in an obvious effect (loss of limb, welder’s eye, etc.) in seconds, minutes or hours. However, there are also occupational diseases, which can take months or years to cause serious damage. For example, lead poisoning was mentioned by Hippocrates, and Agricola’s De re Metallica (1556) says that miners were plagued by corrosive dusts.
The occupational diseases which have been observed in times past included scrivener’s palsy, caissons disease, black lung disease, mad hatters’ disease, painters’ colic, woolsorters’ disease, and phossy jaw. While modern safety measures have reduced the incidence of occupational disease, they have not abolished it. Even in 1996, there were 439,000 new cases of occupational disease (e.g., carpal tunnel syndrome) in the United States.
Historically, the demand for protecting workers from industrial hazards, or compensating them for occupational injuries and diseases, did not become substantial until the nineteenth century.
This reflected both an increase in the number of industrial workers, and a change in the nature of the manufacturing processes. More machinery meant more risk of getting caught in it. New chemical production meant more exposure to chemicals. And “nowhere was the new work associated with the industrial revolution more dangerous than in America.”
As the USE “gears-up” to nineteenth century manufacturing technology, if it does not also give consideration to safety it is likely to experience industrial fatality rates which equal or exceed those of late-nineteenth-century America (about three per thousand workers per year in mines, about 8.5 for trainmen). In the early twentieth century, the injury rate was 44 per million manhours in the steel industry (1910-13), 24 in manufacturing (1926), and 90 in coal mining (1931). (Aldrich).
Rick Boatright’s article on Iron (Grantville Gazette, Volume 3) forecast an increase in USE iron production from 15,000 tons to 150,000 tons in the five years following the Ring of Fire.
The United States produced 69,000 tons of steel in 1870; 1,247,000 in 1880, 4,217,000 in 1890, and 10,188,000 in 1900. It therefore would not surprise if USE iron production were above 1,000,000 tons in RoF+10, and 10,000,000 in RoF+20.
To achieve these levels is going to require a lot of steelworkers. Even in 1975, productivity was roughly 200 tons per worker. If the productivity were 500 tons per worker in RoF+10, that would imply use of 2,000 workers. With a sixty hour work week (that isn’t unusual for the late nineteenth century), that translates to about 40,000,000 manhours and over 1,600 injured workers.
Similar calculations can be made for every industry which the USE would like to foster. Workplace safety isn’t an immediate problem, but it clearly will become increasingly worrisome.
In 1634: The Baltic War, Mike Stearns, standing outside the Magdeburg coal gas plant as the fire brigade tries to cope with a coke furnace fire, muses about the rapid industrial development of Madgeburg: “But nothing came free, and the price they paid for that explosive growth was inevitable. Everything and everybody was stretched very thin, and they weren’t so much cutting corners as lopping them off with an ax. With his own extensive experience in coal mining and stevedoring, Mike knew full well just how dangerous that could be.”
The issue also arose in 1634: The Bavarian Crisis. Keith Pilcher is stationed in the Upper Palatinate, charged to get the iron mines and smelters of the region back into operation. He is worried that none of the local laws “contained any provisions that protected the workers,” and, even if they did, there could be a “considerable difference” between what safety rules said and the way they got implemented (Chap. 22).
Legal and Social Framework
Working exposes the worker to a variety of hazards, some occupations being riskier than others. Societies have evolved a variety of social and legal mechanisms for dealing with these occupational risks.
The simplest approach, of course, is to place the burden directly on the worker. If injured on the job, the worker must be cared for by his or her family, if any, and they suffer from the loss of earning power of both the worker and the caregiver. This might or might not be alleviated somewhat by the charitable deeds of those more fortunate.
In theory, wages should be adequate to compensate workers for the risks of their jobs. In practice, even in the early twentieth century, wages weren’t appreciably higher in dangerous employments. At least, they weren’t proportionate to the accident rate. Nor did the more highly compensated workers show much tendency to lay in a reserve to tide them over in case of a disabling accident. Rather, higher wages meant that they enjoyed a higher standard of living.
The problem with economic theory is that it makes simplifying assumptions. It assumes that the workers have perfect knowledge of the accident rates. It assumes that they will weigh the risks the same way that an economist would. And it assumes that they are free to move into other occupations if the one of interest provides compensation which isn’t commensurate with its risks.
As occupational hazards increased, society found alternative methods of dealing with them. The economic cost of the occupational risk may be borne, not just by the afflicted worker and his or her family, but rather by a group of workers in the same industry, by a larger association of workers, or by the employer. The employer’s liability may be conditioned, as in the case of tort law of negligence, or absolute, as with a workmen’s compensation law. The employer may attempt to pass on some of the cost to customers, and may also attempt to make costs more predictable by obtaining insurance. We will briefly explore these alternatives.
Mutual Aid Groups
Workers could band together to form protective groups. The workers might pay dues which would go into a fund to care for injured members, or to provide support to the family of a deceased compatriot.
This practice is of very long standing. A Roman society of legionary officers in the garrison town of Lambaesis (Algeria) collected monthly dues and paid 500 denarii to the family of a deceased member. (Gray) The medieval guilds, or associated brotherhoods, would “help ill and destitute members” and “pay something toward hospital and funeral expenses.” (Gies, 91) The rules of St. Catharine’s guild provided that
—”If a member suffer from fire, water, robbery, or other calamity, the guild is to lend him a sum of money without interest”
—”If sick, or infirm through old age, he is to be supported by his guild according to his condition.”
—”Those who die poor, and cannot afford themselves burial, are to be buried at the charge of the guild.” (Gray)
In Germany, the Knappschaft—an association of mine workers — “provided a communal safety net whereby some support could be offered to the widows of men killed underground.” (Lynch, 34)
Of course, the guild is not, strictly speaking, an association of employees. The masters are employers of journeymen and apprentices. However, workers did receive some protection against the hazards of their occupation as a result of guild membership.
I think the most interesting example of a mutual aid society is found among pirates. The articles of Bartholomew Roberts’ band stated “every man who shall become a cripple or lose a limb in the service shall have eight hundred pieces of eight from the common stock and for lesser hurts proportionately.” (But there were no death benefits for next-of-kin.)
The guilds were ultimately replaced by “friendly societies.” Unlike the guilds, there was no division into ranks, the members having equal votes, regardless of the member’s investment. Also unlike the guilds, these societies didn’t regulate work practices or prices. Formation of “friendly societies” was encouraged by statute, e.g., the Friendly Societies Act of 1793. The Clerk’s Society (1807) provided a “sickness benefit of one guinea per week for the first 52 weeks of incapacity, reducing by a half for the next 26 weeks and, thereafter, to seven shillings for so long as the incapacity continues.” In the event of total disablement, they paid 30 pounds a year. On death of a member, the widow was paid 100 pounds, or a pension of 15 pounds a year. (Gray)
The United States didn’t have guilds, but in the nineteenth century, there were benefit societies and fraternal orders (essentially, homegrown friendly societies) to which members paid an assessment, or a periodic premium, and from which they received disability or death benefits. In essence, these preserved the mutual-aid aspects of the old guilds by creating a form of insurance. However, the ties weren’t necessarily those of profession; they could be religious, ethnic, or geographic.
Those which operated on an assessment basis charged the remaining members whenever one died. Others operated on a mutual basis, collecting and investing premiums, and distributing the excess of premium income over death benefits to the policy holders. In 1900, there were about 600 fraternal societies in the U.S., and they provided over five billion dollars in life insurance. (Murphy)
The mutual insurance companies likewise collected premiums and paid benefits. They initially provided life insurance, much of which was certainly purchased by employed workers. The first mutual casualty insurance company was the Mutual Boiler Insurance Company of Boston (1877). They covered both injuries to the policyholder, and injuries for which the policyholder was liable. Casualty insurance could be bought by employers or (in theory) by employees.
Employer Liability for Negligence
In the approaches discussed above, the cost of accidents has been borne by workers, either the injured parties alone, or by workers as a group.
But workers could be given the right to sue their employer. The theory was that the employer had a duty to provide a reasonably safe work environment, and that, if this duty were breached, the employer was actionably negligent. It was already well established that certain professions owed a duty of care to their customers. So it wasn’t a huge leap to say that a duty of care might be owed to others, too.
So far as I know, the first recorded Anglo-American legal decision in which a servant sued a master was Priestley v. Fowler (1837). It was a noble failure.
Unfortunately, the courts developed three significant limitations on employer negligence. First was “contributory negligence.” If the employee had been at all negligent, the employer’s negligence was excused. (In modern “comparative negligence,” the relative negligence of the parties is considered, and the negligence of the plaintiff results in reduced damages.)
Secondly, there was the “fellow servant” doctrine. If the accident were the result of a fellow workman, rather than a superior, the employer was not liable. There could, of course, be room for argument as to who was a fellow servant, and who a superior.
Finally, there was the concept of “assumption of risk.” If the employee knew that the job was dangerous, the employee assumed the expected risks of that job.
In view of these legal hurdles, it has been estimated that in the late nineteenth century, fewer than a quarter of industrial accidents could result in liability on the part of the employer (Seager, 59). Of course, even if the employee had a legitimate of expectation of success if suit were brought, that didn’t mean that the employee had the financial resources to obtain legal redress—especially if the accident had rendered the employee unable to earn a living, or if filing the suit would result in dismissal.
Still, suits were brought, and some were successful. In 1853, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld an award of $2500 to a steamboat waiter, then traveling for free as a passenger, who was injured by a boiler explosion.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, some lawyers represented injured workers on a contingency basis. “By 1908, the workers were winning in nearly 15% of all cases.” (Harger) Consequently, many employers obtained liability insurance to protect themselves against the uncertainties involved. About 45% of the premiums actually went to the compensation of injured employees, the rest going to the insurer’s administrative expenses, or profit. And of that 45%, perhaps one-third would then go to the employee’s attorney. (Seager, 62).
Workmen’s Compensation Laws
The inequities and inefficiencies of the tort law led to a statutory solution: workmen’s compensation laws. These laws largely ignored the issue of who was at fault; if a worker were injured on the job, compensation was paid. And it was the employer who was made responsible for funding workmen’s compensation. The lawmakers recognized that the cost of this compensation would be passed on to the consumer, and their answer was, “let the price of the product bear the blood of the workman.”
Workmen’s compensation was in lieu of suits for negligence. While it initially applied only to accidents, it was soon extended to occupational diseases, too.
West Virginia law applies in Grantville and is also being used as a model for the law of the State of Thuringia-Franconia (SOTF). Prior to the RoF, Grantville residents enjoyed the protection of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act.
The principal groups of employers not subject to the WVWCA are employers of employees in domestic service, and employers of five or fewer fulltime employees in agricultural service. (These employers can elect to subscribe to the WVWCA anyway.) Coverage can’t be evaded by an employment contract.
If an employer complies with the WVWCA, it is mostly immunized against common law liability for negligence resulting in the injury or death of an employee. Immunity is lost if the employer acted with “deliberate intention” to injure, or if the employer was aware of the existence of a high risk working condition which violated a state or federal safety statute or a commonly accepted safety standard, and the employer intentionally exposed the employee to that condition, and the employee’s injury or death was a “direct and proximate result” of that condition.
On the other hand, if the employer is covered, but doesn’t comply, then not only is it exposed to suit for negligence, the common law defenses of fellow servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are vitiated.
Of course, employees are not protected against deliberately self-inflicted injuries.
The principle underlying workmen’s compensation is that the cost of caring for injured workers is properly as much a part of the cost of doing business as is the cost of repairing property damaged by industrial accidents, and should be borne by the employer and, ultimately, by the customer.
When workmen’s compensation laws were first broached, some industrialists urged that the employers in that State would be put at a disadvantage relative to competitors elsewhere who didn’t have to price their products in order to pay workmen’s compensation.
It should also be remembered that many of the products which will be made in the USE with up-time technology will be products altogether new to seventeenth-century Europe, and hence the competition for them will be limited. In other words, the manufacturers of novel up-time products will have more flexibility in setting a price, and that price can therefore take the cost of workmen’s compensation into account.
However, this isn’t critical to the survival of industry in a workmen’s compensation country. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one European state after another replaced negligence liability with “no-fault” workmen’s compensation or compulsory state insurance:
1897: United Kingdom
1898: France and Denmark
1901: Sweden, Netherlands, and, to a limited extent, Greece
1903: Belgium and Italy
Obviously, the German factories in 1884 were in competition with the rest of Europe at a time when they, and no other, had the financial burden of workmen’s compensation. For whatever reason, this failed to push them over any economic precipice. Either they were already sufficiently competitive to tolerate the burden, or there were countervailing advantages. Such advantages might include a more skilled workforce (because you don’t lose your more experienced employees to occupational injuries and diseases), and better employer-employee relations.
If the USE adopts a program of workmen’s compensation, then other countries might find themselves compelled to do the same, lest they lose their skilled workers to the factories and shops of the USE. Or even face labor rebellions.
Moreover, the adoption of workmen’s compensation laws would result in a reduction in the financial burden on the state of caring for those left destitute as a result of a workplace injury or fatality. Even in the seventeenth century, individuals in some countries (e.g., England) had a claim on their parish for poor relief.
Accident Prevention: Company Rules, Industry Standards and Protective Legislation
All of the expedients we have discussed so far went to the issue of compensation for loss. What about adopting safer equipment and methods so as to reduce the risk of injury?
The craft guild regulations were mostly concerned with limiting competition, and protecting the reputation of the guild. They did provide some form of insurance for members against injury and death, but they did not give much consideration to workplace safety. Some did regulate work hours, but bear in mind that while long hours could result in careless accidents, they could also lead to shoddy work or a competitive advantage. Thus, it wasn’t a pure safety issue.
The rules of the mining guilds of Saxony and Bohemia did address “hygienic conditions in the mines, ventilation of the pits, [and] precautions against accident.” (“Guilds,” Catholic Encyclopedia). Perhaps this shouldn’t be surprising, because mining was certainly one of the more obviously dangerous occupations. Still, in Douglas Jones’ “Joseph Hanauer, Part Two: These Things Have No Fixed Measure,” (Grantville Gazette, Volume 13), Yossie is shocked when he meets the mine safety engineer Herr Koch; he “never imagined that a nobleman or company would hire someone just to prevent others from hurting themselves.”
The physician Bernardino Ramazzini (1633-1714), the “Father of Occupational Health,” may have been the first scientific authority to suggest methods of reducing occupational hazards. In De Morbis Artificum (1700), he suggested improved ventilation for starch-makers and miners, frequent rests for craftsmen doing fine work, and face masks for sewage workers, bakers, millers, sifters and bricklayers. (Franco)
In the nineteenth century, and more so in the twentieth, laws were enacted which required industries to operate in a safer manner.
It was, of course, possible that an enlightened manufacturer would voluntarily adopt and enforce safety measures, whether out of a humanitarian impulse, or because it had concluded that the cost of the safety measures was less than the cost of paying for medical expenses (if it had that duty) or training replacement workers.
By way of example, one of the few pleasant passages in the 1898 Report on the Use of Phosphorus in the Manufacture of Lucifer Matches related to the Diamond Match Company factory in Liverpool. The main processes were automated; powerful fans changed the air every four minutes; and, if a worker nonetheless contracted phossy jaw, the company paid for false teeth (Emsley, 113). (The Diamond Match Company later developed a safe match using tetraphosphorus trisulfide.)
In contrast, most other British match manufacturers, despite government recommendations concerning ventilation, hand washing facilities, separate dining halls, and dental checkups, ignored the problem. As a result the expectation was that ten percent or more of the workers would develop phossy jaw. The health problem disappeared only when the use of white phosphorus in matches was banned (the United States taxed it out of the marketplace). (Emsley, 103-129).
Even in the Middle Ages, there were laws which attempted to protect towns from the pollution and fire hazards posed by certain workplaces. However, these laws didn’t help the workers themselves.
Perhaps the first true occupational safety law was the British Factory Health and Morals Act of 1802, which required that the larger textile factories (20+ employees) be well ventilated and lime-washed twice a year. It also obliquely sought to improve safety by restricting child labor and limiting work hours.
The enforcement provisions were that the eligible mills register with the clerk of the peace, post a copy of the Act on the premises, and permit inspections by two “visitors,” a county justice and a clergyman. These visitors were analogous to the visitors who oversaw a variety of academic and charitable institutions. (Innes, 230-3; EB11 “Labour Legislation”). Fines of two to five pounds could be imposed for a violation. But EB11 concedes that enforcement “was in many cases poor to non-existent.” (It might have been better to appoint an inspector of less local prestige and more expertise.)
There were additional, more effective, factory acts in later years. The 1833 Act, according to EB11, was the first to provide for inspection by experts who weren’t locals. These inspectors didn’t just conduct inspections, they also promulgated regulations and held hearings on complaints. The 1844 Act, also directed to the textile industry, required reporting and investigation of accidental death (Wikipedia).
The first law applicable outside the textile industry was the 1842 Mines Act, which prohibited women, and children under nine, from working below the surface. Inspection of coal mines was required in 1860. The Coal Mines Act of 1872 required certification of the competency of mine managers, and also had a variety of specific safety provisions dealing with safety lamps, explosives, and roof control. It also provided that negligence could result, not merely in fining, but in imprisonment of the delinquent employer at hard labor.
An 1864 act was the first to concern itself with ventilation of factories other than textile mills. The 1867 Factory Act applied to all factories with more than 50 workers, but was concerned with child and female labor, and work hours. The Factory Act of 1878 included provisions for cleanliness, ventilation, fencing of machinery, escape from fire, and more specific rules for certain dangerous trades.
In the United States, the first bureau of labor statistics was created by Massachusetts in 1860. The state bureaus investigated the safety of textile mills, paper mills and rag shops, match factories, tanneries, bakeries, and other establishments. Their reports, in turn, advocated remedial legislation, including both safety codes and factory inspections. The first factory safety law was enacted in 1877 (again by Massachusetts). Other states followed suit.
This led, naturally, to state-to-state variation in what was required of whom. Eventually, the federal government became involved. The Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted in 1970, and created a federal agency (OSHA) to regulate essentially all five million workplaces nationwide. OSHA initially expected state agencies to conduct inspections and enforce the rules; it found that it had to develop its own staff.
Despite the importance of federal and state regulation in the modern workplace, some safety rules have been developed privately and adopted voluntarily. These rules may be unique to a particular company, or they may be promulgated as an industry standard by a trade association.
One objection which has been made to safety regulations is that, absent enforcement, so many workers ignore them. If they don’t care, why should we?
As Seager said in 1910, “The average workman, whatever his employment, is an optimist. He may know that a certain proportion of his fellow workmen is likely to be killed every year and a larger proportion injured, but he personally does not expect to be either injured or killed.” Hence, the desire for comfort can prevail over common sense. Moreover, some workers are paid on a piecework basis, and the safer work practice can result in lower production.
If reducing the occupational injury and fatality rates is deemed desirable, then the solution to worker noncompliance would seem to be to require the workers to comply, rather than to dispense with safety measures.
Government regulations can be “means” or “result” oriented. A “means” rule specifies the exact equipment or method which is to be used. For example, an eye safety rule which says to use polycarbonate goggles of a particular thickness. A “result” rule just provides a safety goal. For example, goggles which will survive a particular impact.
The advantage of “means” rules is that there is little room for argument as to whether the law is being followed. The disadvantage is that they may be out-of-date, and thus either inadequate (protecting against a risk posed by an older manufacturing technology) or less effective than they could be (excluding a newer safety technology).
For example, under the 1886 New York law, elevator holes had to have automatic hatches. Unfortunately, the hatches were slower than the elevators. Employers refused to install them, as it would be a waste of money, and the inspectors nonetheless had to insist upon them. The solution was to completely enclose the elevator shaft. (MacLaury)
Legal and Social Framework; Pre-Regulation Accident Rates
Maclaury, “Government Regulation of Workers’ Safety and Health, 1877-1917,” http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/history/mono-regsafeintrotoc.htm
1911 Encyclopedia, “Labour Legislation”
Harger, Workers’ Compensation, A Brief History, http://222.fldfs.com/wc/history.html
Seager, Social Insurance: A Program of Social Reform (1910), Chapters II (accident prevention) and III (compensation).
Stein, Priestly v. Fowler (1837) and the Emerging Tort of Negligence, http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/bclawr/44_3/01_TXT.htm
“Factory Laws,” Wikipedia
Gies, Life in a Medieval City (1969)
Lynch, Mining in World History
Emsley, The Shocking History of Phosphorus: A Biography of the Devil’s Element (2000).
Franco, “Ramazzini and workers’ health,” The Lancet, 354:858 (Sept. 4, 1999), online at http://www.collegiumramazzini.org/
Murphy, Life Insurance in the United States through World War I, http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/article/murphy.life.insurance.us
Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, 1880-1970, http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/article/aldrich.safety.workplace.us
US Dept Labor, The Job Safety Law of 1970: Its Passage was Perilous
John Marsh, on “Report to the Stockholders” (1925)
Book Review, of SAFETY FIRST: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939 MARK ALDRICH, 1997 Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press
“Scaffold,” 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica,
BOPCRIS, Browse: Factory laws and legislation
Key dates in Working Conditions, Factory Acts, Great Britain 1300-1899
Summary of Factory Acts in the 19th Century UK
Factory Legislation 1802-1878
ROSPA [Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents] in the Twenties
(discusses the “Safety First” campaign)
Scottish mining accidents
Tuohy, Interurban Railroaders and Changing Work Conditions on the South Shore Line, 1908–1938
Innes, “Origins of the factory acts . . . ” in Landau, Law, Crime, and English Society, 1660-1830 (2002).
Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease to Environmental Health Science (1997).
Hazards; Safety Technology
Poltev, Occupational Health and Safety in Manufacturing Industries (1985)(used frequently but not specifically cited)
Woodside, Environmental, Safety and Health Engineering (1997)
OSHA, Fact Sheet No. OSHA 92-03, Eye Protection in the Workplace
NIOSH, Eye Safety
Sliney, OCULAR HAZARDS OF LIGHT
Elvex, “How Strong is Polycarbonate,”
NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection (Sept. 1987),
Driving Standards Agency, History of the Highway Code
Cummins, The History of Road Safety
[USW] United Steelworkers Training Guides to Industry, “Safety and Health in the American Steel Industry,” http://www.uswsafetyguide.org/3175.php
Burgess, Recognition of Health Hazards in Industry (1995)
IIAHE, “Injuries, Illnesses, and Hazardous Exposures in the Mining Industry, 1986-1995: A Surveillance Report,” http://0-www.cdc.gov.mill1.sjlibrary.org/niosh/mining/pubs/pdfs/iiahe.pdf
“Part Two, Technical Aspects” will appear in Grantville Gazette, Volume 18